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Abstract This article criticizes the ‘ethnic’ conception of organized crime and puts
forward an alternative view that does not put ethnicity first, but rather social networks and
situational context. It focuses upon Chinese organized crime, a phenomenon where the
preoccupation with ethnicity is paramount, and compares findings from extensive
research into two different transnational criminal activities that are carried out by Chinese
offenders in the Netherlands. The first topic, human smuggling, is well researched,
whereas research into the second topic, trafficking in precursors (the basic ingredients for
the production of synthetic drugs), is largely lacking. The article highlights the major
theoretical and empirical similarities and differences between these two criminal
activities and discusses the relevance of the main findings for theory and research.
Introduction
Both in the media and in the criminological literature, the ‘ethnic’ conception of organized
crime is dominant. Ethnicity and organized crime seem to be inextricably linked. Ethnicity
seems to be the key to determining group membership in organized crime, distinguishing
between, for instance, Italian organized crime, Chinese organized crime, Russian
organized crime, and so forth, and is the primary focus of many ‘ethnic’ explanations
of organized crime phenomena (for an overview, see e.g. [6]). This ‘ethnic’ conception of
organized crime bears at least three different dimensions. First, generalizations are made
regarding organizational structure, often related with claims of links with well-known
pyramid-shaped organizations in the countries of origin, most notably the Sicilian Mafia,
Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza, and Russian ‘vor v zakone’. Second, ethnic
homogeneity and ethnic closure are emphasized, and ethnic heterogeneity and inter-
ethnic cooperation are neglected. Third, ideas of ‘ethnic specialization’ tend to identify
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particular ethnic groups with particular crimes. The emphasis on ethnicity produces a
kind of ‘lock-in effect’. It becomes increasingly difficult to break away from these
ethnic preconceptions, as they are easy to use and seem, at first sight, to explain a lot.
In this article, we put forward an alternative view that does not put ethnicity first,
but rather social networks and situational context. We use the example of Chinese
organized crime, a phenomenon where the preoccupation with ethnicity is
paramount. We compare research findings on two different transnational criminal
activities that are carried out by Chinese offenders in the Netherlands. One of these
criminal activities, human smuggling, is well researched (for an overview, see [49]).
Conversely, research on trafficking in precursors, the basic ingredients for the
production of synthetic drugs, is largely lacking. Furthermore, buying, selling, and
trafficking chemicals might involve different mechanisms than a service-oriented
activity such as human smuggling. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework for
the present research. Section 3 describes the main data sources used for this analysis.
Section 4 provides more background information on human smuggling and
precursor smuggling. Sections 5 and 6 highlight the major empirical similarities
and differences between these two different criminal activities. The final section
discusses the main findings and their relevance for theory and research.
Theoretical framework
The literature on Chinese organized crime seems to echo the discussion on the
Italian-American Mafia. Cressey [9] sketched a picture of pyramid-shaped
bureaucracies and was fiercely criticized [3, 17, 36, 38]. Much of this criticism
was justified. However, over time this criticism, together with the rise in popularity
of the term ‘disorganized crime’, seems to have led to a shared idea among some
researchers that well-structured organizations do not exist, and may never have
existed at all. With the benefit of hindsight, one may conclude that well-structured
organizations did indeed exist in the United States [19, 20], as is true of the well-
known Italian Mafia in Italy [31]. This does not preclude, however, the emergence of
many small, ephemeral criminal groups in competitive criminal markets, most
notably (international) drug markets. This is well documented by a collection of
reviews of organized crime research in European countries [13].
Research on Chinese organized crime follows more or less the same pattern,
although with less intense criticism. For years, Inspector Morgan´s portrayal of the
structured nature of Chinese Triads in Hong Kong [29] was viewed as the ‘blue
print’ for Chinese crime. Only recently has research corrected the traditional image
of rigid organizations. While such organizations did exist [42, 46], Zhang and Chin
[50] proposed a ‘structural deficiency perspective’ to explain why traditional
Chinese crime syndicates have not seized upon the opportunities of transnational
criminal activities. As these syndicates and their traditional racketeering activities—
such as gambling, prostitution or loan sharking—are geographically constrained,
they are not well suited to fluid transnational market conditions.1 In an earlier paper,
1 Paoli [31] makes similar remarks regarding international drug trafficking and geographically constrained
Italian Mafia groups.
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Zhang and Chin took a comparative view on organized crime groups in the human
smuggling and heroin market and characterized Chinese criminal groups as
“temporary business alliances” ([49]: 758).
A second emphasis in the literature relates ‘ethnic’ organized crime to ethnic
homogeneity and ethnic closure. Generally, ethnic heterogeneity and inter-ethnic
cooperation are denied or neglected, despite the fact that the literature presents
several empirical examples of crime groups comprised of, or having substantial
interactions with, individuals of various ethnic backgrounds (e.g. [1, 5, 6, 35]).
Furthermore, Kleemans and Van de Bunt [24] demonstrated that criminal
cooperation is not built so much on ethnicity as on social relationships between
individuals. People cooperate because they are family, or because they originate
from the same village. Often this means that they have the same ethnicity, as
ethnicity affects social relations. Yet it does not preclude the involvement of people
from other ethnic backgrounds. Finally, organized crime often involves transnational
activities (e.g. drug trafficking, smuggling or trafficking of illegal immigrants, arms
trafficking, trafficking in stolen vehicles, and other transnational illegal activities
such as money laundering). These transnational activities add new dimensions to the
relationship between ethnicity and crime, because offenders benefit from contacts
between different nations and different ethnic groups [21, 22].
Third, ideas of ‘ethnic specialization’ tend to identify particular ethnic groups
with particular crimes. For instance, Chinese criminals are often associated with
human smuggling, Colombians are more or less equivalent with cocaine, and
Nigerians with fraud. Although it may be true that a particular ethnic group is largely
involved in one specific sort of crime, or is extremely well positioned for particular
criminal activities (e.g. [32]), this does not preclude their involvement in different
illicit activities. Each type of crime imposes different requirements and can be
analyzed from a situational perspective (e.g. [8, 10, 11, 25, 37]). Different types of
crime might be favorable to different kinds of criminal cooperation, as well as to the
involvement of different ethnic groups or different nationalities. Such a situational
analysis might shift our focus from the ethnic backgrounds of offenders to the
opportunities and constraints of the environment, including licit society. In order to
illustrate our line of reasoning, we will compare the research findings on two
different types of criminal activities in which Chinese criminals are involved: human
smuggling and trafficking in precursors. Instead of approaching these phenomena
primarily from an ethnic perspective (with its potential pitfalls), we suggest that a
better understanding of organizational structure and the role of ethnicity may be
produced by analyzing social relations and actual crime settings.
Data
The empirical data are based on police investigations in the Netherlands. The bulk of
information covered the period 1996–2003. This information was originally
collected for research into Chinese human smuggling.2 The database comprised
2 For more information, see Soudijn [39].
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data on 178 individual suspects who were brought to trial on Chinese human smug-
gling charges.
Where synthetic drugs and precursors are concerned, the main focus lies on the
period 2004–2006. During this period, an investigation team of the Dutch National
Crime Squad worked on a special program to disrupt the flow of prohibited
chemicals (precursors) from mainland China and to target the Chinese groups
involved. Over a 3 year period, the team collected information on more than a
hundred Chinese suspects in the Netherlands and abroad. These data were
interpreted by researchers of the National Crime Squad (for more information, see
[15, 16]).
It is important to note that—compared to those in other countries—Dutch
criminal investigations provide a great deal of ‘objective’ evidence on offender
behavior. Most noteworthy is the use of wiretaps. Both in relative and in absolute
terms, the use of intercepted telecommunications in the Netherlands is high. These
telecommunications provide a great deal of insight into the way criminal activities
are carried out, and how offenders collaborate. It is also important to point out that,
in stark contrast to US investigations, Dutch cases do not make use of the very
selective tool of plea bargaining. Furthermore, researchers in the Netherlands have
access to the original police files and are able, to a large extent, to check the files
themselves.
There are, of course, certain drawbacks to police files as research data. The files
are compiled in the interest of criminal prosecution; they are not primarily collected
for research purposes. Many data that would be relevant for social science research
will therefore be absent, such as suspects’ backgrounds or motives. However,
previous scientific studies of organized crime in the Netherlands do show that police
files can have definite added value to academic research into organized crime (see
for a review, for instance, [14, 21]). Perhaps one of the main reasons why police files
are underutilized in academic research (other than the Netherlands) is simply the lack
of access to these files by academic researchers and/or the lack of freedom to publish
independently on results.
Finally, our findings should not be misinterpreted as findings from a repre-
sentative sample. In organized crime research, a random sample of cases or suspects
is inconceivable, as police priorities-highlighting certain criminal activities and
certain suspects-provide the basis for any sample researchers should want to
construct. Therefore, we refrain from quantitative statements and opt for a more
qualitative way of describing our data. The size of our datasets should not seduce us
to draw unwarranted quantitative conclusions. Yet, from a theoretical point of view,
our findings may be very relevant in drawing attention to similarities, differences,
underexposed phenomena, and mechanisms that are present in our datasets and go
beyond incidental case studies.
Background: human smuggling versus synthetic drugs and precursors
The key to both human smuggling and precursor trafficking is the business of illicit
international transport or ‘transit crime’ [21]. Both markets can be described as
service markets. Human smugglers provide their services to those who are restricted
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in traveling to their countries of choice. Similarly, synthetic-drug traffickers provide
a service in distributing goods that are illegal, yet nevertheless in high demand. Both
markets differ from local illicit markets in the transnational nature of the criminal
activities involved: the main profit results from crossing international borders
unnoticed.
Smuggling Chinese immigrants came to public attention in the early 1990s. In
1993, a Chinese human smuggling attempt failed desperately when the ‘Golden
Venture’ freighter ran aground near New York. It turned out that 286 illegal Chinese
immigrants were on board, and several of them drowned as they tried to swim ashore
to evade customs officials. This incident prompted the US government to take action
to stem human smuggling [45]. For European countries, the ‘Dover case’ was the
main catalyst. In June 2000, a Dutch truck driver boarded a ferry to Dover (UK).
When he arrived, custom officials discovered the bodies of 58 Chinese people in his
truck; only two people had survived. The ensuing investigation unraveled a large
human smuggling network. It also regenerated public awareness of human
smuggling in general and smuggling Chinese in particular. Chinese human
smuggling became known as a million dollar business. Chinese immigrants are
willing to pay sums as high as USD 25,000 for transport to the UK, or up to USD
60,000 for transport to the US [27, 48]. Because human smugglers’ expenses are
high, the end-profit is considerably lower [48].
The actual journey may involve a wide variety of possibilities. These journeys
may have the appearance of legality, may be completely illegal, or may involve a
combination of illegal and (apparently) legal travel. A completely illegal journey
might involve people being smuggled out of China and arriving in Europe
undetected, after crossing several countries hidden in a lorry. The other end of this
spectrum comprises migrants applying for a visa to take part in, for instance, a
European conference. The migrants, equipped with genuine passports, subsequently
board a flight to Amsterdam, only to disappear after landing. Had their true
intentions been known to the authorities, they would never have been granted a visa.
Police investigations have shown that such activities are often coordinated by human
smugglers. It is important to note that a substantial part of irregular immigration
makes use of entirely ‘regular’ channels and procedures: tourist visas, business
invitations, asylum systems, marriage fraud, and so forth.
In large-scale human smuggling cases, the Netherlands often acts as a transit
country to the UK and the US. Those migrants who are caught often claim asylum in
the Netherlands. Of course, some already have the Netherlands in mind as a
destination country, particularly if they have family or friends living there (legaly or
illegaly). Depending on the number of people to be smuggled, almost anybody can
enter this market. Someone might lend his passport once a year to enable somebody
else to travel as a look-alike. However, if people are to be smuggled by the dozen
every month, a certain kind of organization is called for to facilitate such a large
number of people. Such organizations often develop from successful small-scale
human smugglers coping with growing demand.
Human smuggling should be distinguished from human trafficking. Human
smuggling relates to illegal migration, and violating immigration laws. It is often a
matter of mutual consent between smugglers and illegal immigrants. Conversely,
human trafficking involves exploitation (e.g. forced prostitution) and violations of
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personal freedom. Of course, human smuggling and human trafficking may be
intertwined. If somebody assists in illegal border crossing and also engages in
exploitation, this is clearly a case of trafficking. However, if there is no link between
exploitation and preceding illegal migration, a distinction should be made between
human smuggling and human trafficking, and between the people involved in these
two different activities [23].
Generally, migrant communities do not regard smuggling illegal immigrants as a
serious offence [41, 51]. On the contrary, smugglers are not viewed as criminals but
as ‘service providers’, offering the opportunity to find a better future elsewhere.
They break the law, yet in the eyes of illegal migrants (and their families) this is all
for the greater good: the provision of a desired journey. Hence, human smuggling
may be characterized as ‘co-production’: a combined effort of immigrants, their
social environment and smugglers to circumvent immigration laws. Immigrants
actively cooperate during illegal border crossing by knowingly using fake passports,
or by keeping silent when hidden in the back of a truck. Human smugglers have a
clear interest in keeping their clients satisfied, as satisfied customers and their
families bring in new business. People often do not migrate as isolated individuals.
Before, during and after the journey, migrants are supported by family, friends, and
acquaintances. In their countries of origin, people help would-be migrants to
accumulate smuggling fees and contact overseas relations in order to find places to
stay and preferably places to work. As soon as migrants find a job, they will start
sending money back home. These remittances provide incentives to send other
relatives (chain migration). Satisfied customers will bring in new business for human
smugglers.
Smuggling synthetic drugs and precursors is rather different. First, it is less
socially accepted. Borders between legality and illegality are less fuzzy when drugs
are involved, particularly hard drugs. Second, these activities–unlike human
smuggling and illegal immigration—are not widespread in Chinese communities.
Third, producers of synthetic drugs need large quantities of precursors, not
something that just anybody can provide.
Like human smuggling, synthetic drugs came to public attention in the 1990s.
Nowadays ecstasy is consumed worldwide, but a significant proportion of the pro-
duction is concentrated in a few countries, most notably the Netherlands and Belgium.
Between 2002–2006, the Netherlands was reported as the origin of 42% of the ecstasy
seized worldwide ([43], 135), although percentages are under debate.3 The average
production costs of an XTC-tablet amount to 56 Eurocents, while average selling
prices in the Netherlands amount to 3.49 Euro. Selling prices are much higher in
many other European countries, particularly in Norway and Italy (about 20 Euro per
XTC-tablet), in most American cities and states (20–30 Euro), in Australia and New
Zealand (about 30 Euro) and in Japan (25–50 Euro) ([26], 75–87).
China is in the unique position of being one of the few source countries of the
essential ingredients for the production of certain synthetic drugs. PMK (piper-
onylmethylketon) is used for the production of MDMA (ecstasy), and BMK
3 UNODC reports that the importance of Europe, particularly the Netherlands and Belgium, as a source is
declining as manufacturing continues to shift and spread (p.149). See also Blickman [4] for a discussion
on worldwide figures.
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(benzylmethylketon) for the production of amphetamine. PMK and BMK are com-
monly called precursors. Worldwide, the production of PMK is almost exclusively
concentrated in the People’s Republic of China. BMK is also produced in some former
Eastern-bloc countries, although Chinese BMK is supposed to be of higher quality.
In large-scale synthetic drug trafficking cases, the Netherlands can be both a
destination country and a source country. In the first case, precursors are shipped to
the Netherlands, where they will be used to produce synthetic drugs. This spells the
last stage of Chinese involvement, because production is commonly carried out by
others. In the second case, some Chinese criminals export the fabricated synthetic
drugs. They obtain methamphetamine or ecstasy from Dutch criminals, thus starting
the first stage of a new smuggling process: the smuggling of illicit goods from the
Netherlands.
Similarities
We start our analysis by focusing on similarities between human smugglers and
precursor traffickers. It turned out that the people involved in these different types of
criminal activity had distinct profiles but a clear social clustering based on
geographical background and language. The Chinese provinces of Fujian and
Zhejiang (particularly the districts Wenzhou and Rui’An ) were an important
background for human smugglers and their clientele. Telephone interceptions
showed most smugglers used their native Wu and Min dialects when dealing with
each other. They could also be heard using the official Mandarin dialect when
smugglers from Fujian dealt with smugglers from Zhejiang. The same kind of
clustering could be found in cases concerning synthetic drugs trafficking. In these
cases, people predominantly spoke the Cantonese dialect, because almost all of them
originated from Cantonese-speaking areas, such as Hong Kong and Guangdong
Province (particularly the Shenzhen district). Both types of smugglers returned to
their native districts from time to time to visit family and friends.
The suspects in both types of crime are truly transnational operators. On a regular
basis, phone calls were made to dozens of contacts in other countries. Moreover,
contact was not restricted to phone calls: the suspects were observed to travel to
other places several times a year. In both types of crime, smugglers frequented
mainland China, yet also visited countries as diverse as the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, Belgium, and Eastern European countries.
Such visits included illegal business. New illegal ventures were set up, or old ones
were maintained.
Case. A human smuggler in the Netherlands used forged passports to put her
clients on commercial flights from airports in Europe to the United States. The
smuggler escorted small groups of Chinese persons to a commercial photo-
grapher living nearby. Next, these pictures were sent to a man in Thailand. He
used them to forge the necessary passports, which were then mailed back using
regular courier services.
Case. Intercepted telephone communications from Canada showed that suspect
A was approached for help in establishing a drug laboratory in Vancouver.
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Suspect A told suspect B he would send a chemical lab assistant. During
another conversation with B, suspect A told him that the assistant had written
‘it’ down. A wanted 30%. Subsequently, B provided A with an address in
Vancouver to send ‘it’ to. ‘It’ turned out to be a document with eight kinds of
chemicals, all needed for the production of (meth)amphetamines.
Neither type of crime is exclusive to ethnic Chinese. In human smuggling, Dutch
or British lorry drivers are approached to transport large numbers of migrants. The
infamous Dover case is a prime example. The actual transportation of 60 migrants
was carried out by a Dutch lorry driver. He was ‘subcontracted’ by people of Turkish
ethnicity who were acting on Chinese requests. In the synthetic drugs market, native
Dutchmen sought contact with Chinese in order to obtain chemicals that are
produced in China. In other instances the Chinese criminals contacted Dutch
producers in order to obtain ecstasy.
Such inter-ethnic cooperation hints at a certain flexibility in partnership. Police
investigations over a longer period of time (e.g. 8 months) indeed showed that the
human and synthetic drug smugglers did not restrict themselves to working
exclusively for a specific person or group. Most telling are those cases in which
the same shipment was used to transport people or goods for different customers. For
instance, in human smuggling cases it was observed that migrants sometimes had
numbers written on their hand in felt-tip pen. It turned out that according to the
number on their hands, they belonged to different smuggling groups.
Case. A human smuggler in the Netherlands received several calls from four
different smuggling groups in the Czech Republic. They passed on their clients
to him. To prevent confusion, the migrants who were numbered 12, 15, and 16
belonged to smuggler X, numbers 24, 25, 26, and 27 to smuggler Y, and so
forth. These migrants were to travel together for a particular leg of their
smuggling journey, yet after arrival they would be split up.
According to the testimony of one suspect, in the failed Dover transport no less
than fifteen different organizers were having their clients (60 in total) transported
across the Channel simultaneously by one single smuggling group in Rotterdam. In
another case, the seized accounts of a human smuggler showed that illegal migrants
who placed telephone calls home were charged different phone rates depending on
which organizer in China they were traveling with. Similarly, in some synthetic
drugs cases a large container full of precursors was compiled of several smaller
portions from different sources. For example, a shipment orchestrated by suspect A
held 2,000 kg of precursors from one source and 3,000 kg from another source.
Another shipment, destined for Hamburg, was compiled of three different sources.
Other research has pointed out that combining shipments is a logical step. Zaitch
[47], for instance, in his study of the cocaine smuggling business, concluded that the
actual transportation of goods often formed a bottleneck. Only a few people were
able to deliver the goods, and consequently others flocked to these people.4 Similar
bottlenecks occur in the human and synthetic drug smuggling cases analyzed for the
4 This relates to the literature on brokerage positioning in organized crime (for an overview, see e.g.
[44]; [30]).
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present study. The crossing of the Channel is an obvious one. As the police files
show, Chinese human smugglers in the Netherlands specialize in such projects.
Shipping precursors from China to Europe is another bottleneck. Only a ‘happy few’
are able to orchestrate such shipments, in which thousands of liters are transported.
It should be borne in mind that such flexibility in partnerships does not preclude
any long-term continuity. If a method has proven useful, it is used repeatedly. Very
often the same persons or companies were involved over and over again. Therefore,
any contacts with outsiders (e.g. people of other nationalities) were also quite stable.
Even when operations were not successful (e.g. migrants or narcotics were
intercepted by the Customs services), trust between partners was of paramount
importance, and both would be on the look-out to continue their business using
alternative solutions. This contrasts sharply with Zhang and Chin’s picture of
‘temporary business alliances’ (we will elaborate on this point in the final section).
Finally, the role played by women is striking. Traditional ideas about crime often
disregard their role (see, for example, [18, 51]). The only roles available to women
are thought to be of a supportive nature or as victims. Certainly, the data from the
Dutch police files show girlfriends who have no say in the proceedings. However,
both in the cases of human smuggling and synthetic drugs trafficking, some Chinese
women could also play a key role as organizers.
Case. A woman boasted on the telephone that she was able to successfully
smuggle 160 people a year (not counting failures) by plane to the US. The
investigation showed that this was no idle boast. On average she tried to
transport 16 illegal Chinese a month. Because she handled such a large number
of people, the smugglers involved in the Netherlands numbered at least 13, not
counting her contacts in China, Thailand, the US, Spain, France, and the UK.
These 13 people in the Netherlands took care of housing, food, transport,
tickets, financial matters, and even grooming to make sure that the people to be
smuggled looked the part of worldly ‘Japanese’ travelers.
Case. Intercepted telephone communications of suspect D showed that he
maintained contacts with a woman in China. They talked about arranging the
transportation of containers to Canada. The ensuing investigation showed that
a container containing almost 2,000 L of BMK had been transported. It turned
out that smuggler D and this woman were able to get the chemicals from the
production source in Shenzhen.
Case. Suspect A often called a woman nicknamed ‘big sister’ (godmother) in
Hong Kong to keep her abreast of all developments in the narcotics smuggling
business, including precursors, ecstasy pills, and marijuana.
Differences
We now turn our attention to several differences. It stands to reason that the
smuggling methods and routes will differ. People need air, for instance, whereas
chemicals are better off not being exposed to oxygen. Furthermore, many differences
occurred within the same crime market. Smuggling sixty people hidden in a cargo
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container follows a very different logistical path from putting three people with fake
passports on board of a commercial airline. However, looking beyond such
operational matters, are there fundamental differences between human smugglers
and precursor traffickers, as highlighted in our case studies?
First, it turns out that the two types of crime have different criminal profiles.
Human smugglers are in their twenties or thirties, are recent émigrés from mainland
China, and often use Mandarin to communicate (besides their native dialects).
Synthetic drug smugglers, on the other hand, are in their forties or fifties, have been
living in the Netherlands for quite some time, and hail from the Cantonese-speaking
areas. Apparently, having the right background has an influence on the criminal’s
standing. In the human smuggling market, people from Hong Kong play only a
subordinate role. In the synthetic drugs market, it is the people from Fujian or
Zhejiang who do only menial jobs such as packing crates, not orchestrating routes.
Second, another noticeable difference is the smuggler’s involvement in other
types of crime. Most human smugglers just concentrate on smuggling people and do
not display versatility. No evidence is found of selling migrants into prostitution.
Often an investigating team started out with the assumption they would discover a
cesspool of abuse, but this was never the case. In general, smuggled persons worked
very hard in the illegal labor sector, which could sometimes be described as
exploitation. However, there was no evidence that the smugglers were directly
involved in such exploitation. Furthermore, in no single case did the smugglers use
their trafficking routes for the (simultaneous) transportation of both narcotics and
migrants. There was no evidence of the structural involvement of human smugglers
in the drug trafficking business. Conversely, the people involved in the synthetic
drugs market showed more versatility. The next case is a typical example:
Case. Suspect A was involved in all sorts of crime. He was involved with
suspect E in an ecstasy transport to England, the procurement in China of
4,000 L of BMK for suspect F, the planning with suspects N, L, and P of
smuggling ecstasy pills to Japan, the transportation of hash to England, and
with C in the establishment of a methamphetamine laboratory in Canada.
Furthermore, he could be heard talking about plans to import fake travel tickets
and engage in cigarette smuggling.
Third, the police files show that the combination of a relatively older age bracket
and higher versatility also contributes to precursor smugglers being more likely than
human smugglers to have a criminal history, to be known to the Dutch authorities.
For instance, in the 1980s and early 1990s, they were mostly involved in heroin
smuggling. Quite a few also had a history of violence and some had even been
involved in murder.
Fourth, in the world of synthetic drug smuggling, violence was an ever-present
threat. In a 3 year period, four Chinese involved in the synthetic drug business were
murdered, possibly in contract killings. Although these murders have never been
solved, it was rumored that they had their origins in failed drug deals. In another
instance, after a boatload of precursors had been intercepted by the authorities, one
suspect (suspect H) was so terrified of being held accountable for the loss that he
went into hiding. Another indicator of violence, or potential violence, is the
confiscation of firearms and ammunition, in possession of several synthetic drug
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smugglers. Conversely, human smuggling shows less violence between smugglers
than is apparent between those active in the synthetic drugs market. Of course, some
violence did occur, but this was not on a structural basis. Over an eight-year period,
several beatings and three murders were recorded. However, nearly all the beatings
were related to one group of smugglers. In one case, for instance, someone was held
responsible for a financial loss and was ordered to pay compensation. When he
failed to pay, he was kidnapped, tortured, and left for dead. However, it would be
dangerous to make generalizations based on this specific case, because other
smugglers did not display such behavior. Furthermore, the murders also had rather
mundane explanations. One man was killed because of marital infidelity; two others
were shot (one of whom was an innocent bystander) because of a violent fall-out
between former friends.
Fifth, although both forms of crime involve people who are not ethnic Chinese,
the manner of their involvement differs. In the human smuggling business, non-
Chinese people can be characterized as contractors. The actual smuggling action is
outsourced to them and the relationship remains purely instrumental. The Dutch
drivers call the Chinese smugglers to inform them when they are ready, or are called
upon to direct the smugglers to a certain place. The police investigations have shown
that the drivers barely know more than the names of their contacts. Even more, the
police files show that large-scale transports are often secretly accompanied by the
Chinese without the Dutch drivers’ knowledge. They follow the same route in a car
and observe whether everything goes well. Another possibility is for them to cross
over to the UK earlier and wait for the transport to arrive. Conversely, in the
synthetic drugs market, the relationship between Chinese and non-Chinese is of a
more symbiotic nature. The Chinese provide an essential ingredient or become a
valued customer of the end-product. Some inter-ethnic collaboration even stretches
years back and has developed in close cooperation.
Case. In 2005 ethnic Dutch buyer G traveled with Dutch-born Chinese T to
Hong Kong. T acted as interpreter. They wanted to test the shipping line. A
few months later, T went to Hong Kong again to make preparations to send a
container. Suspects C, T, and another ethnic Dutch buyer G were also observed
in an internet cafe looking for descriptions of harbors in Germany.
Sixth, a major difference concerns the structure of the smuggling groups. Large-
scale police investigations into human smuggling showed the same persons carrying
out the same tasks over a long period of time (i.e. several years). This continuity,
coupled with the fact that the persons working together often lived near each other,
made it possible to clearly distinguish smuggling groups. The smugglers involved in
the synthetic drugs market seem to be more flexible. They co-operated for short
periods of time with different persons in various criminal enterprises. The
aforementioned versatility is also an indication of the lack of a consistent criminal
organization. The synthetic-drug suspects were not only involved in transporting
precursors from China, but were also active in other types of crime. They sometimes
worked together, yet at other times they acted independently in different criminal
projects. Suspect A is a good example: someone who was involved in dozens of
criminal enterprises, and therefore took the police on a rollercoaster of divaricating
investigations. Suspect A was no exception. Other Chinese synthetic drug smugglers
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were also involved in different criminal projects. On the arrest of suspect T, for
example, a search of the premises turned up approximately 90 kg of Asian heroin.
The investigating team thought he was only involved in precursor smuggling and
was willing to buy ecstasy tablets from ethnic Dutch criminals. At that time, the
police had no idea of his heroin contacts.
We conclude this section with some remarks on the (possible) involvement of
Triads. In the human smuggling cases, there was no indication of the involvement of
any Triad groups, nor was any formal Chinese organization involved based on
region, occupation or clan affiliation (also known in the US as 'Tongs'). During the
investigations, such rumors were often shown to be absurd. One possible exception
could be the case of a human smuggler romantically involved with someone said to
have a Triad background. When this romance came to an end because of the
imprisonment of his significant other, the suspect seems to have put a levy in place.
The remaining smugglers had to pay him a certain amount for every person
smuggled to the UK. This rather gives the impression of old-school racketeering:
he would protect the smuggling business or non-payment would result in bodily
harm [40]. In the synthetic drug market, the possibility of a Triad connection could
not be precluded. According to four experienced police interpreters, some suspects
were related to Triads, particularly the 14-K.5 One of the investigations showed a
failed attempt to enter a Triad. Other (limited) evidence consists of intercepted
telephone communications with Hong Kong which seemed to be related to Triadic
contacts.
Discussion and theoretical implications
Having established that there are several similarities and differences, this final
section discusses theoretical explanations and puts forward an alternative view that
focuses not on ethnicity, but rather on social networks and situational context.
The difference between geographical backgrounds might be traced to accessibil-
ity. Studies on migration have shown that successful migrants stimulate imitation
[28, 33, 34]. Visits back home combined with displays of wealth inspire those who
stayed behind to seek their fortune abroad as well. Potential migrants ask family
members, friends and acquaintances who have already migrated to provide support
in the form of knowledge, capital or other assistance in arranging the journey, the
stay or a job. As a consequence, chain migration ensues. If legal transit is restricted,
potential migrants make appeal to overseas friends and family members to render
assistance for illegal transit. One major smuggler admitted that she started out in this
way, but soon found herself being approached by an ever-expanding circle of
friends. Hence it is to be expected that in human smuggling, people from the local
home area are involved. For the last couple of decades, the demand for migration has
been particularly strong in the provinces Fujian and Zhejiang. Compared with
smugglers from mainland China, people from Hong Kong do not relate to what goes
5 A well-known Hong Kong based Triad (see, e.g. [46]).
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on in mainland China, speak a different dialect, and do not have extensive family
and clan ties.6
Geographical factors could possibly also explain the lack of Triadic involvement
in human smuggling. One should remember that Hong Kong has more of a ‘Triad’
history than does mainland China. Triadic organizations (whatever their make-up) in
the Netherlands are often linked to the 14-K from Hong Kong or the Ah Kong from
Singapore [12]. Yet in the smuggling cases, these two nationalities constitute only a
minority. Triads would probably have a hard time tapping into the human smuggling
market, because most migrants originate from Fujian and Zhejiang, not Hong Kong
or Singapore [50]. Besides, even if Triads operate overseas, their involvement is
traditionally associated with the heroin business. On the other hand, a shift from
heroin to synthetic drugs is not inconceivable, even more so if one considers that
essential precursors are exclusively produced in mainland China and shipped
through Hong Kong.
The versatility of synthetic drug smugglers–compared to human smugglers–finds
its likely explanation in the actual carrying out of the criminal processes. The human
smuggling business can be characterized as a labor-intensive industry, particularly
when journeys take months to complete. The police files show that the migrants
were stashed in safehouses waiting while the smuggler tried to fix the next leg of the
journey. When the smuggler endured a series of setbacks (e.g. problems with finding
a driver or fixing a passport), the waiting could stretch from weeks to months. In the
meantime, migrants needed food, shelter, basic hygiene, and so forth. Some
smuggling methods relied on deceiving border guards. In such cases, migrants were
trained to take on a fake identity, including background story, or even to speak a
couple of foreign words. Furthermore, the smuggler had to make sure these people
were watched. The migrants had to be kept in check (particularly when they had
already been waiting for a long period and became restless), otherwise the neighbors
might suspect something. Smugglers also had to make sure they did not run away
before expenses had been met. Particularly when there were more than 10 potential
migrants in one batch, it became important for the human smuggler to have reliable
helpers on hand. Conversely, synthetic drug traffickers appear to have an easier job.
Once a shipment is en route, there is nothing much to do but wait. Because shipment
by sea can take weeks or months, this frees up time to develop other criminal projects.
The importance of women acting as organizers in the human smuggling market is
certainly not a Dutch aberration. For instance, the 1993 Golden Venture incident in
the US was allegedly carried out by a woman arrested in 2000 [27]. Some
researchers point out that in migrant communities human smuggling is generally not
considered to be a very serious crime, and therefore has a low social stigma attached
to it [51]. Human smuggling enables people to bring over family members who
would otherwise have been left in their home countries. At the same time, it presents
a good opportunity to make some money. Furthermore, women are considered less
6 People in different parts of China may show different opinions on illegal migration, based on different
levels of economic development. Note that people from Hong Kong also do not feel the urge to migrate
illegally. The economy is on par with Western countries and provides ample job opportunities. This is a
completely different situation from the 1950s. Dutch archives show that at that time people from Hong
Kong arrived illegally with the help of their compatriots. See also Soudijn [39].
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threatening than males and thus have a head start in building up a good reputation in
the human smuggling business. Nevertheless, the Dutch files indicate that one would
be mistaken in choosing a smuggling organization under female management on this
basis. Some of the worst maltreatment of migrants occurred in female-led
organizations. Zhang and Chin also hypothesized that in more traditional crime
markets, such as heroin, the importance of women would be insignificant [50].
Compared with human smuggling, it would have more of a social stigma attached
and violence would be a greater risk. However, the data from the Dutch files show
that this has not prevented some Chinese women from playing an important role in
the synthetic drugs market. This certainly calls for further explanation that goes
beyond gender-based theories, and thus further empirical research.
The different patterns of collaboration between ethnic Chinese and ethnic
Dutchmen can also be explained by highlighting their actual function. The human
smugglers themselves often lack the skills and knowledge to keep large-scale
transportation ‘in house’. Hence they have to rely on outsiders with the knowledge
to obtain a lorry and (fake) cargo and with the necessary skills and papers to drive
the lorry. Similarly, for the Dutch producers of synthetic drugs, some chemicals are
hard to come by, particularly the high-quality, Chinese PMK and BMK. However,
the language barrier would make it very difficult for non-Chinese to negotiate in the
murky waters of the Chinese chemical industry. Dutch producers therefore have to
rely on outsiders to obtain their much needed illicit precursors. Conversely, Dutch
producers of ecstasy pills are well-known for the high quality (and quantity) of their
products.7 It is therefore beneficial to Chinese traffickers to obtain it relatively
cheaply directly from the source in the Netherlands. Hence, the relationship between
Chinese and Dutch synthetic-drug producers is rather symbiotic. Conversely, this
level of mutual partnership could not be observed in the human smuggling cases.
People of non-Chinese ethnic background operated almost exclusively in the role of
transporter. On the one hand, this made them valuable resources and they were paid
handsome amounts of money (€1,000 per smuggled person). On the other hand, they
were dispensable, and ran great risk of getting caught in the act. The less a Dutch
lorry driver knew about his contacts, the better chance of survival a smuggling
operation had. Because Chinese smugglers could always find a replacement, they
prudently kept their distance.
This study also shows a difference between the organizational structure of human
smuggling groups and synthetic drug smugglers. Human smugglers acted in fixed
groups, and synthetic drug smugglers could be described as belonging to loose
networks. This difference can be explained by the axiom ‘form follows function’.
First of all, we take a look at human smuggling in the Netherlands. The data shows
that large-scale smugglers in the Netherlands concentrated on a particular leg of the
smuggling journey. Consider an illegal journey that leads from Fujian to the UK. If a
direct flight is out of the question, the journey goes through several countries. Such a
journey often leads from China to Moscow, through the Czech Republic, Germany,
and the Netherlands, before arriving in the UK. In this scenario, the smugglers in the
7 For years, ecstasy pills produced in China could not reach the quality level of the Dutch ones. Interviews
with drug experts attribute this discrepancy to years of experience and the chemical sophistication of the
Dutch producers.
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Netherlands take care of the Channel crossing, an important bottleneck. As noted
before, when a human smuggler is successful, he will see his business grow by word
of mouth. As one smuggler explained to an investigating officer, he did not need
recruiters. Potential migrants would flock to him because of his good reputation.
More importantly, the smuggler in the Netherlands also receives a lot of business
from other smugglers abroad. The result is a continuous process of handling the
requests of individual clients and receiving smaller or larger groups of illegal
migrants from other smugglers abroad. The phone literally never stops ringing. To
handle these continuous flows, the large-scale human smuggler needs a reliable crew
to take care of matters, and over time fixed routes develop. In these conditions, the
formation of a coherent smuggling group makes more sense than having a loose
network of individuals who form ‘temporary business alliances’ [49].
These fixed routes, and the continuous process of dealing with migrants, contrast
with findings from other studies. Human smuggling was described as a business
without territory, a business which mostly involved once-off transactions [51].
Nevertheless, in a transit country such as the Netherlands this seems not to be true. A
side effect is that, because of the existence of fixed routes and continuity, traditional
organized crime groups can and sometimes do levy ‘taxes’, as was shown in section 6.8
Furthermore, the portrayal of criminal partnerships as loose networks nowadays all too
easily disregards the fact that the relationships between criminal individuals can be
relatively stable. Family or ethnic bonds can be seen as affective relations, which will
ensure cohesion [7]. These bonds do not indicate flexibility and fluidity but durability
and consistency. Even more so, when outsiders prove to be reliable, common sense
will dictate they too will be used more than once.
Still, this observation does not constitute a call for the return of Cressey-like
hierarchical organizations. When the human smuggling groups are placed in an
international setting, instead of a local focus, the network theme becomes more
prominent. Similarly to the situation in the Netherlands, where several different
smuggling groups could be identified, the files show that there are different
organizers with several people working for them in the Czech Republic, France, the
UK, China, and so forth. This is an important finding, because it shows that the
smuggling group in the Netherlands worked for different organizers in China or
elsewhere at the same time. The Dutch group is therefore not linked to one specific
organizer in China, for instance, but offers its services to different parties. The result
is a complex stream of migrants. In other words, the smuggling groups act
autonomously, but it is their mutual cooperation that leads to the establishment of
smuggling routes. Although human smuggling groups are quite cohesive at a local
level, the term ‘temporary business alliances’ is an appropriate description when the
whole smuggling route is taken into account.
Remarkably, the whole organizational make-up of synthetic drug smuggling could
be explained as the reverse. From the Dutch perspective, the Chinese individuals
involved in the synthetic drugs market display all the characteristics of a loose
network that makes use of temporary business arrangements. A couple of people
worked together in one criminal project, yet on an individual level, they could be
8 This kind of extortion is not restricted to Chinese human smugglers. An Albanian group, for example,
extorted dues from any human smuggler who wanted to make use of a certain harbor [40].
Chinese organized crime and situational context 471
separately involved in different, other criminal projects, with different collaborators.
However, if we look at our data rigorously, loose synthetic drugs smuggling
networks may contain hints of some form of central coordination that are linked to
bottlenecks. Whereas the human smuggling market is relatively easy to enter,
precursors originate from a single, geographically constrained source, i.e. Chinese
chemical factories. This might create a fertile breeding ground for monopolizing
access to these factories, and hence for central control.
In this article, we tried to escape the 'lock-in effect' of ethnic generalizations that
dominate the media accounts and much of the literature on ethnic organized crime.
We suggested that one should not put ethnicity first, but rather social relations and
situational context. At the same time, this approach does not reject ethnicity as an
explaining factor, but tries to place this factor in a situational perspective. Applying
this perspective to different criminal activities and different ethnic groups makes us
aware of interesting similarities and differences that go beyond ethnicity. Hence, we
agree with Albanese [2] that ethnicity is perhaps the most common of all
categorizations of organized crime, although it might be the most misleading.
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